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INTRODUCTION
The human body is a limited resource that depletes over time. In
our increasingly technological age, the wonders of modern medicine
have come to include reliance on medical devices that assist and sustain
the human body. These devices extend the amount of resources we have
to rely on when the human form fails. However, with our increased
reliance on medical devices, new problems have arisen regarding the
extent to which these devices should be regulated and monitored. Current
government regulation by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”)
serves as a rubber stamp endorsing the medical device as a safe product.
This policy has created a conflict within the legal system where a “safe”
medical device causes injury to a consumer in need. Traditionally, where
medical error by the human hand or judgment causes harm, those injured
are provided recourse in the law through common law tort claims and
medical malpractice statutes. However, the advent of medical devices
supplementing the human hand where it can no longer aid coupled with
the broad regulatory scheme surrounding such devices leaves the
question of whether persons injured by medical devices will have the
same recourse under the law.
The legal system has not provided a solution to the problem of
whether or not a person can sue under state common law tort principles
for injuries caused by a medical device. The issue occurs due to the
Federal Drug Administration’s regulation of the safety and effectiveness
of medical devices. The FDA is responsible for regulating and
supervising medical devices used for medical care. The statute detailing
the extent of the FDA’s regulation of medical devices includes an
express preemption clause, which has caused great controversy in its
interpretation. The circuit courts as well as the Supreme Court have
reviewed the FDA preemption clause and the tension it creates with state
common law tort claims. This comment focuses specifically on the most
important and certainly the most dangerous class of medical devices,
Class III. In addition, this comment discusses the circuit court decisions
that have split over the issue of whether persons have a right of action
against device manufacturers in light of an express preemption clause
forbidding state law claims that impose different requirements than the
FDA.

2006] Preemption Under the MDA: Can Bates Mend the Wound?

233

Traditionally, state common law tort claims provide recourse from
injury caused by negligence and defective products resulting from a
defective design, a manufacturing defect, or a failure to warn. In the
context of medical devices, such claims might conflict with the FDA’s
determination that the device was safe for human use. For example, a
prevailing judgment against a pacemaker manufacturer for negligent
design appears contradictory to the FDA’s approval of the pacemaker as
safe for human use. The argument for federal preemption of state law
claims follows from the conflict between FDA requirements and
common law tort judgments against the manufacturer that conflict with
the FDA’s requirements for the device. The argument against preemption
counters that adverse judgments in common law tort claims would not
conflict with the FDA requirements, because they impose parallel
requirements. If the medical device is defective, persons who are harmed
should have recourse in the law. Both arguments hinge on the definition
of different “requirements” with respect to FDA regulation.
This comment provides a summary of the FDA’s regulation of
medical devices and the circuit split over the scope of the express
preemption clause prohibiting states from imposing any requirement that
is either different from or in addition to a specific federal regulation.1
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr has left the
circuit courts without a clear test to apply with respect to the FDA’s
regulation of Class III medical devices.2 The extent to which FDA
regulation preempts state common law claims has been a source of
frustration for both the circuit courts and the plaintiffs who wish to
litigate such claims. This comment will advocate a more coherent
approach to the issue. By applying the recent Supreme Court decision in
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, this comment clarifies the scope of
preemption that should apply when the FDA approves a device through
the premarket approval process.3 This comment provides a new test
through which circuit courts should reevaluate their stance on
preemption. Furthermore, this comment will discuss the impact of the
Bates decision and present a new framework to guide future circuit court
decisions. This new approach will allow state common law claims that
parallel federal safety and effectiveness requirements.
Part I provides a basic overview of the Medical Device
Amendments and the FDA, particularly the express preemption clause
that has been the source of the circuit split. This section provides a brief
overview of the purpose of the FDA’s regulation in the area of medical
1
2
3

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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devices and details the different categories and classes of medical
devices. Part I also describes the premarket approval process and
discusses the express preemption clause contained within the Medical
Device Amendments. This section provides an overview of the principle
statutes and medical device classifications that are essential for an
informed reading of later sections.
Part II provides a summary of the controlling circuit court decisions
that have established the scope of the MDA’s preemptive effect over
state tort claims. This section is the most comprehensive part of the
comment. It serves as a general survey, which provides the basic facts,
reasoning, and outcome of each relevant circuit court decision. This
section divides the circuit court decisions into three categories according
to the courts’ common analyses of the issue. The contrast among the
three categories of circuit court decisions illustrates the expansive nature
of the circuit split as well as the need for a uniform test.
Part III summarizes the recent Supreme Court decision in Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences and recommends a solution to the circuit split. This
comment provides a new test which applies the Bates decision to the
FDA premarket approval process, despite the failure of the Supreme
Court to directly address the issue.4 The new framework suggests a
“parallel requirements” test that circuit courts should apply to determine
the scope of preemption with respect to the common law tort claim. Part
III urges courts to look to the intent of the Medical Device Amendments
and Congress in enacting the express preemption clause and apply the
“parallel requirements” test. This section further discusses some of the
concerns related to allowing tort claims of negligence to be brought
against device manufacturers. The comment concludes by advocating the
imposition of the new “parallel requirements” test as suggested by the
Bates decision.
I. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENT AND THE EXPRESS PREEMPTION
PROVISION
The Federal Drug Administration is entrusted with a great amount
of responsibility as the governmental regulator of the current health care
system in the United States. The role of the FDA has continued to grow
to the point where its role as a regulator affects every single person living
in the United States; however, the FDA’s duties extend far beyond the
scope of this comment. The FDA is both respected and criticized by the
public and corporations alike. It continues to be a gatekeeper for products
entering the medical market. However, in its role as a gatekeeper,
4

Id.
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conflicts have arisen regarding the protection of the products and the
companies that have passed through its gates.
The FDA acts as the ultimate gatekeeper with respect to medical
devices, forbidding use of devices that have failed to meet its approval.
Such devices are regulated according to a comprehensive statutory
scheme that was enacted over thirty years ago. In response to concern in
the 1970’s relating to medical devices that were unregulated, Congress
passed the Medical Device Amendment of 1976 (“MDA”) and created a
broad regulatory scheme providing for medical device review and
classification.5 A basic understanding of the definition of medical
devices and their classifications is necessary in order to understand the
extent of the legal analysis of this comment.
A. Classification of Medical Devices
Medical devices exclude drugs, but include the devices that
diagnose human illness and devices used to cure or improve illnesses and
disabilities.6 Some medical devices are more extensive in composition
than others; some devices are made from one singular part and others
require many moving parts working together. The difference between a
plastic bandage and an implanted pacemaker requires the FDA to
separately regulate the different devices into classes according to their
complexity and their risk to humans. The FDA divides medical devices
into three classes under the MDA.7
5
For a well-summarized background of the history of FDA regulation and
congressional action see Sasha B. Rieders, Note, State Law Tort Claims and the FDA:
Proposing a Consumer-oriented Prescription in Medical Device Cases, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1159 (2004).
6
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). The statute explains that
[t]he term “device” (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section and in
sections 331(i), 343(f), 352(c), and 362(c) of this title) means an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory,
which is – (1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals,
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary
intended purposes.
Id.
7
See Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Premarket
Approval under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 245 (2004)
(“Class I Devices-devices that ‘present minimal potential for harm to the user.’ For
example, elastic bandages are classified as Class I devices. Class II Devices-devices that
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Class I devices are those subject to general controls that “are
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of the device.”8 Only general controls are necessary with respect to Class
I devices because these devices have a relatively low risk factor for
human use. Additionally, a Class I device is one that the FDA deems
relatively safe although the FDA cannot determine how much control the
device should receive. 9 A device will be categorized in Class I, even if
the effects of its use are unknown, so long as the intended use of the
device does not greatly impact human health and its foreseeable use
would not be dangerous to human health.10
Class I medical devices are usually simple in design and
execution.11 These devices are not subject to strict controls because their
use presents the least amount of risk to the consumer.12 Device
manufacturers of Class I devices are subject to general administrative
controls including registration of the device and record keeping.13
However, if the device is ever found to be dangerous or cause harm, the
manufacturer is required to notify the FDA.14 The manufacturer of a
Class I device must also comply with requirements that the device be
sanitary and include accurate product labeling, which does not mislead
the consumer.15 Common examples of Class I devices include plastic

pose a greater risk of harm than those in Class I, but less risk than those in Class III.
Class II devices include items such as some home pregnancy tests. Class III Devicesdevices that sustain or support life, are implanted, or present a potential unreasonable risk
of illness or injury. Class III devices also include some lower-risk products that lack
predicates. Class III devices represent approximately ten percent of the medical devices
on the market. Examples of Class III devices include pacemakers and breast implants.”
(citations omitted)).
8
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i)(2006).
9
Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii). The statute states that
[a] device for which insufficient information exists to determine that the
controls referred to in clause (i) are sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device or to establish special
controls to provide such assurance, but because it—(I) is not purported or
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a
use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, and (II) does not present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or
injury, is to be regulated by the controls referred to in clause(i).
Id.
10
Id.
11
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006).
12
Id.
13
21 U.S.C. § 360(f)-(j).
14
Id.
15
21 U.S.C. §§ 351-52 (2006).
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bandages, examination gloves, and certain types of hand-held surgical
instruments.16
Class II devices include devices where the general controls are
insufficient to maintain safe use of the product and additional restrictions
and control are imposed on certain devices by the FDA.17 Class II
devices include electronic wheelchairs, infusion pumps, and surgical
drapes.18 Specific Class II medical devices may be exempt from
additional controls where the FDA feels “these exemptions will relieve
manufacturers from the need to submit premarket notification
submissions for these devices and will enable the FDA to redirect the
resources that would be spent on reviewing such submissions to more
significant public health issues.”19 Class II devices separate generally
harmless devices, listed in Class I, and Class III devices, which represent
a risk of significant harm. These “more significant public health issues”
are reflected in the FDA’s concern over the classification of Class III
medical devices.20
A Class III medical device is a device that requires more stringent
controls imposed by the FDA due to the risk associated with the device
and its use in maintaining human life. The statute defines a Class III
medical device as one that plays such an important role in “supporting or
sustaining human life” or is unreasonably dangerous that it requires
substantially more control than required by Class I and II devices.21
Common examples of Class III medical devices include laser eye surgery
equipment, pacemakers, replacement heart valves and breast implants.22
Consumers who seek the aid of Class III medical devices generally have
a substantial need for the product to maintain their quality of life. Often
times, people rely on these devices to support their existence in this
world. The FDA provides an electronic database through which
consumers and companies alike can search for Class III medical

16

U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006).
17
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2006).
18
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
Device Advice, Device Classes, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/3132.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
19
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
Device Advice, Medical Device 510(k) and Good Manufacturing Practice Exemptions
list, FDA website, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006).
20
Id.
21
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
22
See Scandaglia & Tully, supra note 7.
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devices.23 Class III medical devices are marketable only after passing
either the “premarket notification” (“PMN”) or “premarket approval
process” (“PMA”).24 The PMN and the PMA represent more stringent
controls that correspond to the high stakes intrinsic to use of Class III
medical devices.
The PMA process has been described as “rigorous,” requiring
extensive submissions, time, and expense on behalf of device
manufacturers in order to market a Class III device to the public.25 The
goal behind this process requires the manufacturer of the device to
“provide the FDA with a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is both
safe and effective.”26 The PMA application submitted by the
manufacturer requires that the manufacturer of the device have
undertaken numerous scientific studies, including non-clinical laboratory
studies and clinical investigations.27 Where a Class III device was
approved by the FDA through the PMA process, this comment answers
the lingering question of whether injured consumers may bring common
law tort claims against the device’s manufacturer.
The success of PMA process, in assuring the safety of medical
devices, has been subject to great debate and Congress has acted with
23

Device product classifications can be found by searching the Product
Classification Database, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/
classification.cfm. The database search provides the name of the device, classification,
and a link to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), if any. The CFR provides the device
type name, identification of the device, and classification information.” U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice,
Overview-When a PMA is Required, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2006).
24
21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e(b). The PMN process is also known as the “§
510(k) process” and provides for approval of a device, without undergoing the more
extensive PMA. Id. The FDA must determine that the device is “substantially equivalent”
to a device that was in existence before the MDA. Id. The PMN process acts similar to a
rubber stamp on a medical device that has a substantial equivalent already functioning in
the market. Id. The PMN process is far less extensive than the PMA approval process. Id.
The court in Medtronic held that a device that undergoes the PMN process and
subsequently causes injury to a consumer will not enjoy preemptive protection from state
common law tort claims. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). The scope of
this holding has created a division in the courts of appeals. Although the majority of the
circuit courts apply Medtronic to hold devices approved under the PMA process to a
higher standard and find preemption, the Supreme Court failed to comment on the issue,
hence the nature of this note. See id.
25
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477.
26
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)). “PMA approval is based on a determination by
FDA that the PMA contains sufficient valid scientific evidence to assure that the device is
safe and effective for its intended use(s).” U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, Device Advice, Overview-Introduction,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/devadvice/pma/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
27
See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2006).
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respect to the process’s efficiency. Congress enacted the Safe Medical
Devices Act of 1990 due to concern over the way medical devices were
being approved under the PMA process.28 Additionally, Congress passed
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 in order “to ensure the timely
availability of safe and effective new products that will benefit the public
and to ensure that our Nation continues to lead the world in new product
innovation and development.”29 The FDA issued a statement of guidance
regarding the FDA Modernization Act urging a more streamlined and
“least burdensome approach” for future regulation. The ideal goal of the
least burdensome approach when applied to premarket approval would
be a reduction in regulatory burden and industry resources, all the while
maintaining the safety of the public.30 Still, it is unlikely that the FDA
can maintain an effective PMA approval process by applying the least
burdensome approach given the increased demands on the FDA and
consumer reliance on medical devices. In fact, the FDA’s PMA process
can easily be described as burdened itself.
The overview of the PMA approval process for Class III medical
devices should provide an idea of the difficult and tedious effort required
to offer medical devices to the public. Given the great responsibility and
duty of the FDA in governing the medical devices on the market, the
legislature has afforded the FDA protection in the form of an express
preemption clause.31 The exact scope of the express preemption clause
as applied to the FDA’s use of the PMA process has been the subject of
great debate, with courts finding on both ends of the spectrum. Thus, a
brief summary of the meaning of preemption and its application is
necessary in order to set the context by which courts have argued to limit
state common law tort claims.
B. Express Preemption and the Circuit Splits
Preemption of state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause,
which states that the “[l]aws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme

28
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4(a), 104 Stat.
4511, 4515 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006)).
29
S. REP. NO. 105-43 (1997), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?report=
sr043&dbname=105& (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
30
The Least Burdensome Provisions of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997:
Concept
and
Principles;
Final
Guidance
for
FDA
and
Industry,
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/1332.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006). But see
Goodlin v. Medtronic, 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he entire purpose of the
PMA process is for the FDA to obtain a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is safe and
effective.”)
31
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
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Law of the Land.”32 Therefore, “state law that conflicts with federal law
is ‘without effect.’”33 As the Supreme Court held in Medtronic v. Lohr:
In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”34

Where a statute such as the MDA contains an express preemption clause
the “task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence
of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” 35
The MDA includes an express preemption clause, codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360k, which outlines the situations where federal law surpasses
state law with respect to FDA medical device regulation.36 The FDA’s
interpretation of § 360k further elaborates that preemption only applies if
the FDA has specifically issued equivalent regulations or device specific
regulations that conflict with state requirements and that those state
requirements are “different from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA]
requirements.”37 The express preemption clause is meant to avoid the
conflict that would exist if states enforced requirements with respect to
medical devices that clashed with the federal requirements set forth by
the FDA. The preemption clause was also meant to address the tension
created between the states’ interest in maintaining the health and welfare
of its citizens and the FDA’s role as the gatekeeper for the medical
32

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
34
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted).
35
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
36
The express preemption provision of the MDA provides that
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1)
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness
of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to
the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
37
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2005).
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] has
established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific
requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making
any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device
different from, or in addition to, the specific [FDA] requirements.
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999).
33
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device market. However, the boundaries of the express preemption
clause remain to be tested, as the scope of the clause as applied to state
common law tort claims is the subject of debate.
A majority of circuit courts have found that state common law tort
claims are preempted by the express preemption provision; however, the
courts’ reasoning is splintered. 38 A minority of circuits have held that
state common law tort claims are not preempted. Those courts have
allowed such suits to proceed where a Class III medical device has
caused injury. In the following section, this comment will detail each
circuit court’s stance on the scope of the MDA’s express preemption
provision. The Supreme Court’s decision, in Medtronic v. Lohr, and the
Court’s recent decision, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, will be used to
advocate the application of a new “parallel requirements” test to
determine the scope of preemption in the context of the PMA approval
process. It is important to employ a uniform approach to the scope of
preemption and the ability of injured consumers to seek recourse in the
legal system. The MDA does not provide a private right of action. Thus,
consumers are left to seek legal action through state common law tort
claims.39 The circuit split over whether state common law claims can
survive against device manufacturers effectively leaves some consumers
with a remedy in the legal system and most without.
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Medtronic v. Lohr
The Supreme Court’s precedent on federal preemption with respect
to FDA regulation has been inconsistent at best and leaves a lack of
guidance for future circuit court decisions on the matter. In Medtronic v.
Lohr, the Supreme Court held that state common law tort claims were
not preempted by the FDA’s approval of a medical device through the §
510(k) process.40 The plaintiff in the case brought various state common
law tort claims sounding in negligence and product liability as a result of
injuries suffered from a pacemaker that was implanted in her chest.41 The
pacemaker was considered a Class III medical device, which entered the
market through the § 510(k) process.42 The § 510(k) process differs from
the PMA approval process, because it is a determination that the product
being approved, in this case the pacemaker, is substantially equivalent to
a similar device on the market and therefore it is unnecessary to go

38
39
40
41
42

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 480.
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through the more rigorous PMA process.43 Despite the difference in
approval processes, the express preemption provision applied to the
pacemaker and the Supreme Court analyzed the scope of its language
with respect to the plaintiff’s state common law tort claim.44
The Court first looked to the intent of Congress in enacting the
MDA and noted that Congress did not intend to preclude all state
common law claims.45 The Court stated, “when Congress enacted §
360k, it was primarily concerned with the problem of specific,
conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the general duties
enforced by common-law actions.”46 Congress did not intend to prevent
persons injured by medical devices from seeking recourse in state
courts.47 Where a state requirement parallels the federal requirement the
Court held that there would be no preemption, as parallel requirements
would not be considered “different from or in addition to.”48 The Court,
in a plurality opinion, rejected the medical device manufacturer’s
argument that the express preemption provision barred every state
common law claim from being brought against them.49 The Court
stressed that it was unlikely Congress meant to preempt state common
law tort claims where the language of the preemption provision points to
more specific “requirements,” such as state statutes or regulations.50
However, the Court neglected to find that state common law claims
would “never” constitute specific state requirements, leaving the debate
open with respect to the limits of the preemption clause.51
Justice Breyer issued a concurring opinion, which set forth the
position that “requirements” in the express preemption provision of the
MDA could very well include state common law tort claims.52 Justice
Breyer focused on the effect of an adverse state court judgment and
expressed how the state common law tort claim would be no different
from a state regulation.53 The concurring opinion noted the difficulty in
interpreting the express preemption provision in the MDA where the

43

Id. at 478.
Id.
45
Id. at 487.
46
Id. at 491. “The legislative history also confirms our understanding that 360(k)
[sic] simply was not intended to pre-empt most, let alone all, general common-law duties
enforced by damages actions.” Id.
47
Id. at 487.
48
Id. at 470.
49
Id. at 486.
50
Id. at 490-91.
51
Id. at 503.
52
Id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53
Id.
44
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language is “highly ambiguous.”54 Despite Justice Breyer’s skeptical
review of the preemption provision with respect to state common law tort
claims, he ultimately found that plaintiff’s claims were not preempted
due to the lack of specificity imposed on the device through the § 510(k)
process.55
Justice O’Connor issued an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Breyer that state
common law claims resulting in damages would have the same effect as
a device specific state regulation. However, Justice O’Connor voiced her
disagreement with the interpretation that the MDA provision only
preempts specific federal requirements and stressed that the focus should
be whether the requirements are “different from, or in addition to” the
federal requirements.56 Despite her argument for preempting state
common law claims that compete with federal requirements, Justice
O’Connor concurred in the judgment where the state common law tort
claims were not effectively different from the minimal federal
requirements imposed under the § 510(k) process.57
The Court’s plurality decision in Medtronic has left the circuits
without substantial guidance. The majority of circuit courts interpret
Medtronic to find no preemption where a device has been approved
under the § 510(k) process.58 However, the decision failed to address the
preemption analysis where the medical device at issue has undergone the
more extensive examination under the PMA process. The decision also
failed to institute a clear test, which future courts could apply to the
preemption issue. The decision in Medtronic led to disjointed opinions
from the circuit courts. Since the decision in Medtronic, circuit courts
have attempted to piece together various tests that would follow the
language used by the Supreme Court. Without a clear path to follow, the
circuit courts have split three different ways and the need for a uniform
test becomes more apparent as time goes by.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLITS—THREE CATEGORIES OF REASONING
The decisions of the circuit courts of appeal can be divided into
three categories, with a majority finding that the express preemption
clause in the MDA defeats state common law tort claims. The first
category encompasses those circuits that conclude that the requirements
of state common law claims differ from those imposed by the PMA
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 505.
Id. at 506-08.
Id. at 512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 513.
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1999).
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process and, therefore, must be preempted according to the statute. These
courts have looked to how a state law judgment would create a different
requirement for manufacturers of medical devices than the one set forth
by the PMA process. The second category consists of those circuits
which have found state common law tort claims preempted by the PMA
process because the process itself constitutes a specific federal
requirement. These courts reason that the holding in Medtronic does not
extend to devices approved under the PMA process due to the extensive
nature of testing and scrutiny required, which conflicts with state
common law claims. The third category of court decisions hold that the
PMA approval process does not preempt state common law tort claims;
these courts support claims brought against device manufacturers
sounding in negligence and product liability. With slight variation, these
courts reason that the PMA process is not a device specific control,
lacking any requirement directed at the particular device. To further
develop these categories, this comment will now summarize the different
circuit court decisions per each category and provide the factual basis on
which each case was decided. This summary will show the reader the
variety of potential claims and the scope of preemption.
A. Category I—Preemption Based on Different State Requirements
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit’s pre-Medtronic decisions in King v. Collagen
Corp.59 and Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.60 held that federal law preempted
state common law tort claims including negligence and breach of
warranties against medical device manufacturers. In King, the plaintiff
brought claims arising from an injury caused by Zyderm, an injection
approved to treat skin imperfections and wrinkles as a Class III medical
device.61 The plaintiff suffered a severe injury to her face due to the
Zyderm injection.62 She then brought several state common law claims
against the device manufacturer.63 The court held that all state common
law claims were preempted because the cause of action against the
manufacturer imposed a specific state requirement that is prohibited by
21 U.S.C. § 360k.64 Although this case was decided prior to Medtronic,
subsequent First Circuit cases have affirmed its holding finding that state
59
60
61
62
63
64

983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
63 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1995).
King, 983 F.2d at 1131.
Id. at 1132.
Id.
Id. at 1135-36.

2006] Preemption Under the MDA: Can Bates Mend the Wound?

245

common law tort claims are preempted because they impose different
and additional requirements than the federal requirement promulgated
under the MDA.65
Post-Medtronic, the district courts have questioned the First
Circuit’s current position concerning preemption.66 In Haidak v.
Collagen Corp., a plaintiff, with injuries and claims paralleling the
plaintiff in King, brought a claim against the manufacturer of Zyderm.67
The one difference between Haidak and King was that the injuries in
King were an “unintended result of which both she and the FDA were
unaware.”68 In analyzing the application of King to the issue of PMA
approval preemption of state common law tort claims, the district court
held that “[p]ost-[Medtronic], this court cannot conclude beyond
peradventure of doubt that the First Circuit’s decision in King would
necessarily be the same.”69 The court held that the manufacturer could
not succeed at the summary judgment phase by arguing that the PMA
process preempts any state law claims as a matter of law.70 While not
deciding the issue of preemption, given the facts of the case, the court
suggested that preemption would apply only where the FDA had enacted
device specific requirements.71 The PMA process in itself did not
preempt common law claims.72 Therefore, future state common law
65

Id. at 1131.
See Haidak v. Collagen Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Mass. 1999).
67
Id. at 25.
68
Id. at 34. The court explained:
While King implies a broad preemptive sweep, it is apparent to the court
that King is factually distinct from the instant matter. There, the plaintiff’s
negligence claim, indeed all her claims, arose out of an unwanted
autoimmune reaction to Zyderm. As the First Circuit made clear, the FDA
was especially involved in the labeling process regarding the inclusion of
contraindications regarding autoimmune reactions. The King plaintiff’s
allegations derived from the fact that Defendant failed to reveal known
dangerous propensities of Zyderm despite explicit FDA directives to do so.
In the instant matter, the gravamen of [the p]laintiff’s claim is very different.
Although [the p]laintiff advances a very generalized complaint-that
Defendant was “careless and negligent in the design, manufacture,
distribution, sale and/or conveyance of the product”—the core of her claim
is that the Zyderm migrated from the injection site, an unintended result of
which both she and the FDA were unaware.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
69
Id. at 29.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 29-33. The claim at issue in this case arose from use of a Collagen injection
approved under the PMA process that was applied to the plaintiff’s eyes and nose. Id.
The Collagen caused injury by migrating throughout her body to form a mass in her
lymph node. Id. The migration of the Collagen to another part of the body was a result
that was not addressed or known by the FDA. Id. The court explained:
66
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claims against Class III device manufacturers could be brought against
device manufacturers in the First Circuit where the FDA has failed to
enact device specific requirements.
2. The Second Circuit
In Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., the Second Circuit found that
state common law tort claims were requirements that would interfere
with requirements that the PMA process imposed on device
manufacturers.73 The court held that such state claims were preempted.
This case concerned a “prosthetic device implanted in cataract patients to
replace the natural lens of the eye.”74 The court analyzed the PMA
process reviews and compared them to the claims brought by the
plaintiff.75 The Second Circuit determined that, if the plaintiff were
allowed to prevail on these claims, the judgment against the device
manufacturer would constitute additional requirements different from
those posed by the PMA process.76 Thus, the FDA’s determination that
the device was safe for human use preempted those claims that directly
conflicted with that determination.77
The Class III medical device at issue in Becker was not approved
by the PMA process at the time it was implanted in the plaintiff’s eye.78
The device had an investigator device exemption from the PMA process
and the plaintiff was part of a study to determine its safety and
effectiveness.79 However, the court’s decision was not affected by the
experimental nature of the device as “the [c]ourt stated that the state law
claims were pre-empted whether or not the device was subject to the
specific regulations, or the general regulations relating to an IDE.”80 The
court concluded that its interpretation of the MDA’s express preemption

Although the court is loathe to address [the p]laintiff’s claim of migration in
any detail, it appears that the claim, as so framed, might be able to avoid the
broad preemptive bar of the MDA. Nothing in the record to date suggests
that the FDA enacted specific requirements regarding the standard of care
necessary to obviate product migration.
Id. at 34.
73
Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1995).
74
Id. at 19.
75
Id. at 20.
76
Id. Although the decision was made pre-Medtronic, the Second Circuit has not
changed its ruling and the district courts have not provided any criticism. The state of
such claims in light of Medtronic is subject to argument.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 19.
79
Id.
80
Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181, 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
the Medtronic decision does not conflict with the holding in Becker).
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provision applied to state statutory law as well as common law.81 The
Second Circuit aligns with the other circuits that consider state common
law tort claims as different requirements, which conflict with the FDA
and trigger preemption by federal law.
3. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit in Duvall v. Bristol Myers-Squibb interpreted
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic and stated that “§ 360k(a) of
the MDA preempts state-law causes of action to the extent that, if
successful, they would impose requirements different from or additional
to requirements specifically applicable to the particular device under the
MDA.”82 The plaintiff in Duvall brought claims against a Class III
device manufacturer for breach of warranty, defective design and failure
to warn, among other state law claims.83 The plaintiff had been
implanted with an inflatable penis prosthesis that was approved by the
FDA through the § 510(k) process.84 The court found that the plaintiff’s
state common law claims would have been preempted if the FDA had
issued device specific requirements to the device at issue.85 In its
holding, the court noted that the § 510(k) process did not constitute a
federal device specific requirement because the device was only subject
to general controls for approval.86 This case did not decide the issue of
whether or not the PMA process would preempt state common law tort
claims, but it showed that the Fourth Circuit would most likely have
found the claims preempted because they were additional requirements
with respect to the PMA process.
In Woods v. Gliatech, the District Court for the Western District of
Virginia decided that state common law tort claims were not preempted
where the FDA issued a conditional PMA to a Class III medical device.87
The plaintiff had suffered injuries as a result a Class III medical device
applied as a gel to lessen scarring and pain after surgery.88 The plaintiff’s
claims against the manufacturer included state common law tort claims
for negligence, breach of warranty and fraud on the public.89 Aligning
itself with the Eleventh Circuit, this court found that “the FDA’s review
81

Becker, 66 F.3d at 19.
Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324, 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
83
Id. at 326.
84
Id. at 328. Note that approval through the § 510(k) process means that a
substantially similar device was preexistent in the marketplace at the time of application.
85
Id. at 332.
86
Id.
87
Woods v. Gliatech, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 802 (W.D. Va. 2002).
88
Id. at 804.
89
Id. at 805.
82
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and approval of the PMA, by itself, imposes no ascertainable federal
requirements.”90 Therefore, the court did not allow the defendant
manufacturer of the medical device to use the conditional PMA approval
as protection from the lawsuit.91 It is unclear how this broad holding will
be applied, and, specifically, whether the Fourth Circuit will apply the
same analysis to the completion of the PMA process, as opposed to only
a condition approval.92
4. The Fifth Circuit
In Martin v. Medtronic, the Fifth Circuit held that § 360k(a)
preempts state products liability claims when the Class III medical
device manufacturer complies with the FDA’s PMA process.93 The
plaintiffs’ claims against the Class III medical device manufacturer
included product liability claims for negligence and breach of warranty.94
The plaintiffs were implanted with pacemakers and suffered injuries
allegedly from a defective lead wire in the device.95 The court held that
Medtronic did not overrule its decision in Stamps v. Collagen Corp.,
because the holding in Stamps correctly found state tort claims
preempted under the MDA.96 The court stated, “we can conclude only
that general duties of care can generate specific requirements that

90

Id. at 808. The court further rejected the circuit court decisions finding that “the
PMA approval process itself constitutes a specific federal requirement” rejecting views
held by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 807.
91
Id. at 808-10 n.4. While holding that the conditional PMA approval was not a
specific federal requirement preempting state law, the court gave further ammunition for
its holding. Id. The device manufacturer Gliatech had engaged in deceptive practices
with respect to the reporting and submission of medical data about the use of its device to
the FDA. Id.
The FDA’s approval letter specifically stated: “Failure to comply with the
conditions of approval invalidates this approval order. Gliatech
subsequently pled guilty to submission of materially false and misleading
data with respect to the U.S. study. Thus, even assuming the conditional
PMA constitutes a preemptive requirement, the court finds that Gliatech’s
failure to comply with the PMA conditions invalidated the FDA’s approval
of ADCON-L.”
Id. at 808 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
92
See Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 69 F. App’x. 140 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding that state law claims, relating to failure to warn and the labeling of tampons,
were preempted by the FDA’s specific approval of labeling requirements and the FDA’s
consideration of risks involved with the product).
93
Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001).
94
Id. at 575.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 580.
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conflict with specific FDA requirements” and supported a finding that
the PMA process itself constituted a specific federal requirement.97
Despite finding the plaintiffs’ claims preempted, the Fifth Circuit
provided a possible avenue for relief for litigants attempting to sue a
medical device manufacturer. The court, with reference to the Medtronic
decision, stated that “common law duties that incorporate the PMA
process, such as the general duty to take due care to comply with the
PMA process in labeling or manufacturing, will never contain specific
requirements that are additional to or different from federal
requirements.”98 The court implied that it would allow a claim that
encompassed aspects similar to those imposed by the PMA process. The
scope of the general duty stated by the Fifth Circuit and the extent to
which a court would entertain such claims seems unclear. Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit provides for a possible private right of action against
medical device manufacturers that do not comply with the PMA
process.99

97

Id.

Id. at 582. The court noted that
[t]his reasoning is consistent with the majority opinion; while the general
duty, standing on its own, is not a threat to federal requirements and is not
developed specifically “with respect to” medical devices, the elements
needed to prove a violation of that general duty may be very specifically
tailored to the device, and the state court action may therefore threaten
specific federal requirements.

98
Id. at 583 n.8. Recognizing binding precedent in the Fifth Circuit, the court in
Betterton v. Evans found that the plaintiff’s state law claims against a pacemaker
manufacturer were preempted despite a slightly illogical holding. 351 F. Supp. 2d 529,
536 (N.D. Miss. 2004). In its conclusion, the court expressed its discomfort with its
holding:
The court notes its disdain for this mandatory conclusion given that
“Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, in the words
of the statute’s preamble, ‘to provide for the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices intended for human use.’” The evidence presented in this
case to date indicates that the subject pacemaker simply did not work. A
pacemaker can hardly be said to be safe and effective when it not only does
not work, but also requires subjecting a patient to the agony of opening and
reopening his chest[,] because the pacemaker is malfunctioning and neither
the pacemaker–company representative nor the surgeon implanting it can
figure out how to make it work. In other words, the court must abide by the
law which unfortunately disallows patients or their heirs a remedy when a
FDA–approved Class III medical device malfunctions and ceases to be safe
and effective.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
99
Martin, 254 F.3d at 583 (“In the context of the PMA process, we agree that state
tort suits that allege, as the basis of their claim, that the approved FDA requirements have
not been met are not preempted.”); see Haddock v. Mentor Tex., No. 3:03-CV-2311-B,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4975 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2005) (suggesting that plaintiffs, who

250

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:231

5. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit in Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. followed the
majority rule when it held that the PMA process imposed specific federal
requirements on the medical device where the FDA had required
additional warnings, and that a state common law tort claim would
impose “specific state requirement[s] ‘different from, or in addition to’
specific federal requirements.”100 Bone cement is a Class III medical
device.101 The plaintiff in this case brought products liability claims for
injuries resulting from her occupational use of bone cement.102 As a
nurse, the plaintiff was responsible for mixing the bone cement used in
orthopedic surgeries.103 She claimed that the manufacturer’s inadequate
labeling failed to warn her of the dangerous vapors, which result from
mixing the cement.104 The court developed a three-step test to determine
whether the PMA preempts the state common law claims.105 The court
must first determine what federal requirement was imposed on the
medical device manufacturer in getting the device on the market.106
Second, the court must discern the state requirement that would be
imposed on that manufacturer.107 In the third and final step, the court
must “compare the two to determine whether they present conflicting
obligations” on the device manufacturer.108 If so, the court will find the
state claims preempted under § 360k.109 This approach looks at the
specificity of both the federal requirement and the state requirement.
Importantly, this decision did not imply that the PMA approval
process would always constitute a specific federal requirement or that
state common law tort claims would always be specific state
requirements. The court’s three-step test provides a case-by-case
evaluation of the device allegedly causing injury and the claims brought
against the manufacturer. Additionally, the court distinguished its
holding from those circuits that have not found preemption:

show evidence that the manufacturer of the Class III device, failed to follow the PMA
standards could avoid federal preemption).
100
Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. 273 F.3d 785, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §
360k (2006)).
101
Id. at 789.
102
Id. at 787.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting in part).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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Those circuit court decisions since [Medtronic] which have
not found preemption in failure to warn cases were faced with
circumstances different from those in this case. . . . In Goodlin v.
Medtronic, Inc., a case in which the FDA had issued no statement
or order of requirements beyond review and approval of the
initial PMA, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that simple approval of
the PMA application imposes no federal “requirements.” The
Goodlin court implied, however, that it would find preemption in
a case involving an “ascertainable requirement in an express
FDA” order or regulation. That is what we have here, where the
FDA has issued a series of specific mandates regarding the label
for Simplex [bone cement]. Simplex has been subject to
continuing and specific FDA regulation, beyond its initial
approval through the PMA process.110

Therefore, the Eighth Circuit’s position with respect to devices approved
by the PMA process, without further regulation by the FDA, remains an
open question. Given the language used by the Eighth Circuit, the court
would be unlikely to find such claims preempted where the FDA gave
the device only PMA approval. The Eighth Circuit would most likely
draw the line where the FDA has subjected the device to additional
modification or requirements after the PMA approval process.
B. Category II—Preemption Based on the PMA Process
1. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit recently shifted its reasoning to hold that state
common law tort claims were preempted by the MDA. In Horn v.
Thoratec Corp., the plaintiff brought product liability claims against the
device manufacturer of a “HeartMate” pump, a device that surgeons
implant into patients to allow blood flow to certain areas of the heart.111
The lower court applied a two-prong test to find that the PMA approval
process constitutes a specific requirement of the FDA and preempts state
common law claims.112 The court found that such state claims would be
preempted if “1) the FDA has established specific federal requirements
that are applicable to that particular device, and 2) the state claim is
different from, or in addition to, the specific federal requirements.”113
Applying this test, the court held that any judgment by a state court as to
a specific product’s safety directly conflicts with the FDA’s
110
111
112
113

Id. at 795-96 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 165.
Id.
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determination, through the PMA process, that the product was safe.114
The lower court began and ended its analysis by finding the PMA
approval process was a “specific federal requirement.”115
However, the Third Circuit did not define what constitutes a
“requirement” for preemption. The court engaged in a general discussion
of the rigors of the PMA and the back and forth communication between
the FDA and the manufacturer during the process.116 The court found
that the PMA process was a federal requirement and held “the
requirements imposed by the FDA upon the HeartMate when it was
granted PMA approval are precisely ‘the sort of concerns regarding a
specific device’ which the Supreme Court intimated would give rise to
preemption under § 360k(a).”117 The court concluded that the PMA
process “imposed mandatory conditions” on the medical device and
equated it to a federal requirement.118 Additionally, the Third Circuit
considered an amicus curiae brief, filed on behalf of the FDA, providing
the agency’s opinion that the “PMA approval in this particular case
requires preemption,” in which the Court found support for its holding.119
In his dissent, Judge Fuentes expressed strong opposition to the
majority’s reasoning in Horn.120 Judge Fuentes agreed that the PMA
process was a specific federal requirement but he disagreed that all state
common law tort claims were “specific requirements.”121 Judge Fuentes
also rejected the majority’s reliance on the amicus curiae brief submitted
by the FDA that urged a finding of preemption in this case.122 The dissent
refers to Congressional purpose in enacting the MDA as protecting
consumers from harmful medical devices and rejects the majority’s
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 169-70.
117
Id. at 169.
118
Id. at 170. The analysis of what constitutes a federal requirement for purposes of
preemption has varied greatly from circuit to circuit, giving rise to the different categories
provided by this note. See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1375-76 (11th Cir.
1999). “The approval represents only a finding that the manufacturer’s proposal to
market a device has reasonably assured the FDA of the device’s safety and effectiveness.
. . . [T]he approval [does not, however] provide any indication of what (if any) specific
substantive requirements the FDA may have applied to reach that result.” Id. at 1375.
Additionally, FDA authorization “is clearly specific to the device under review, but
because the approval itself neither reveals nor imposes any ascertainable substantive
prerequisite for approval that we could compare to a purportedly conflicting state
requirement, the approval itself does not fit within section 360k(a)(1)’s demand for a
specific federal requirement.” Id. at 1376.
119
Horn, 376 F.3d at 177.
120
Id. at 180 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 182 n.29.
115
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conclusion that Congressional purpose was to balance the manufacturer’s
need for innovation versus the consumer’s need for safety.123 With Judge
Fuentes as the lone dissenter, the majority rule will stand strong in the
Third Circuit, which finds preemption for most state common law tort
claims.124
2. The Sixth Circuit
In Kemp v. Medtronic, the Sixth Circuit found that state common
law product liability claims, fraud on the FDA, and state failure to warn
claims were all preempted by the PMA process.125 The plaintiff brought
common law negligence and product liability claims against a Class III
device manufacturer for injuries sustained due to an allegedly defective
wire in her pacemaker.126 The FDA approved the pacemaker at issue
through the PMA process and thereafter subjected the device to a PMA
supplement due to a modification of the materials used in its lead wire.127
Two years before surgeons implanted the plaintiff with the device, the
FDA recognized a “significant risk of failure” for the lead surrounding
the wire and the device manufacturer issued a “Health Safety Alert”
about the specific model pacemaker.128 Additionally, the court noted that
“the FDA has never promulgated federal regulations regarding the
manufacture of pacemaker leads.”129
In rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Goodlin v.
Medtronic, the court recognized the difficulty the respective courts of
appeal have encountered while interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Medtronic.130 The court first found that the PMA process was a
specific federal requirement and agreed with the device manufacturer
123
Id. at 185 (“As the [Medtronic] court observed, the purpose of the MDA was to
protect consumers by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. Contrary
to . . . assertions, protection of the medical device industry from excessive regulation was
a minimal concern.” (citations omitted)).
124
The Third Circuit’s scope of the FDA’s preemption clause appears to be the
broadest of all of the circuit court decisions in that it finds that the PMA process is a
specific federal requirement, regardless of the device. Id. at 169 (majority opinion). The
Third Circuit also holds that state tort claims relating to the device are additional
requirements, regardless of the claim. Id. Therefore, regardless of the device regulated or
the claim proposed against it, the Third Circuit would most likely find all claims
preempted by the FDA’s PMA approval.
125
Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 237 (6th Cir. 2000).
126
Id. at 219.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 226.
130
Id. at 224 (“The various courts of appeals that have confronted issues of
preemption arising under the MDA have struggled mightily with [Medtronic’s] language
in the effort to discern its holding.”).
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that “it is the totality of the design, manufacturing processes, and
labeling–when coupled with the prohibition against modifying them–that
represents the specific federal requirement.”131 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that a verdict against the device manufacturer would
constitute a “requirement different from and in addition to those
established by the FDA”; therefore, the plaintiff’s state law tort claims
were specific state requirements.132 The finding that the PMA process
constitutes a device specific requirement that conflicts with state law
claims has been upheld in later Sixth Circuit decisions.133
3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit most recently joined the majority precedent. In
McMullen v. Medtronic, the Seventh Circuit found that the specific
federal requirements imposed by the FDA preempted state law tort
claims.134 The plaintiff brought state common law claims for failure to
warn against a Class III device manufacturer because of injuries he
suffered from the implantation of a tremor control device in his brain.135
The FDA approved the Class III device, as well as the additional specific
warnings displayed on the device, through the PMA process.136 The
plaintiff premised a failure to warn claim on the information the
manufacturer issued regarding new risks of injury or death through the
use of the device.137 The plaintiff claimed that, although the device
manufacturer had issued a warning regarding a new risk of injury, the
warning came too late to avoid his injury.138
131

Id. at 228.
Id. at 230. The concurring opinion notes the possibility of a claim for failure to
comply with the federal requirements. Id. Judge Moore, citing to the majority opinion,
agreed that
“a claim premised on the violation of FDA requirements
established for a Class III device through the PMA process is
not automatically preempted.” Thus as the majority recognizes,
a claim for negligence per se premised on the absence of a
platinum sputter barrier as required by the FDA approval
would not be preempted because the state claim would not
impose requirements different from or additional to the federal
requirements.
Id. at 237 (Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
133
See Cupek v. Medtronic, 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding to its previous
stance on preemption despite an attempt by the plaintiffs from Kemp v. Medtronic to
bring suit again for modified claims against the medical device manufacturer); see also
Moore v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N. D. Ohio 2004).
134
McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005).
135
Id. at 484.
136
Id. at 485.
137
Id.
138
Id.
132
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Relying on its previous decision in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., the
court found that the PMA process is a specific federal requirement,
which preempted the plaintiff’s claims.139 The court held that the
warnings provided with a device were approved by the FDA and that a
state law failure to warn claim directly conflicts with the specific federal
requirement.140 Although the Mitchell Court acknowledged its significant
difficulty interpreting the Supreme Court’s Medtronic decision and the
scope of the FDA requirements,141 the Seventh Circuit considered the
PMA process to be a specific federal requirement preempting state
common law claims. The Seventh Circuit’s difficulty analyzing the
preemption issue shows the problem presented to all circuit courts.
C. Category III—Common Law Claims Are Not Preempted
1. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., held that the
PMA approval process, by itself, is not a “requirement” with respect to a
specific device.142 The plaintiff brought common law claims of
negligence and product liability against a device manufacturer for
injuries sustained from an injection of collagen.143 The court reversed the
summary judgment order and held that the common law claims were not
139

Id. at 490.
Id. at 488 (“If Medtronic believed that a warning different from the one approved
by the FDA was appropriate in light of an adverse event, it was required to seek FDA
approval of any proposed changes. These are relevant federal requirements limiting [the
manufacturer’s] conduct as to the warnings it issued to [the device] recipients.” (citing 21
C.F.R. § 814.39(a)).
141
The court stated:
The implementing regulation for the FDA is likewise imprecise and fails to
address squarely the issue of preemption by common law causes of action.
Lastly, although we have an obligation to be absolutely faithful to the
holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States, the holding in
Medtronic contains several ambiguities that impair our ability to perceive
with absolute clarity the path that the court has chosen for us to follow. . . .
The ambiguity central to our task is the tension between the holding of
the Court embodied in the text immediately above and Justice Breyer’s
belief, essential to the formation of a majority, that at least some state-based
causes of action would be preempted by the MDA. Like the majority of
courts that already have had to deal with this quandary, we believe that the
Medtronic disposition must be read as acknowledging that at least some
state-based common law causes of action must be considered ‘requirements’
as that term is employed in the MDA.
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997).
142
Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part by
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
143
Id. at 1454.
140
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preempted by the PMA process where the FDA had not issued a device
specific requirement.144 The court explained:
All Class III devices are required to obtain pre-market approval
before being sold in interstate commerce. The fact that the premarket approval process involves specific requirements, must not
be confused with the pre-market approval requirement itself
acting as a specific requirement. The result of holding that the
pre-market approval process is a “specific requirement applicable
to a particular device” is the preemption of claims which, if
barred, leave injured plaintiffs without any remedy in state or
federal court.145

The court further expressed its disbelief that this preemption clause
would effectively bar all state common law tort claims, stating “‘[i]t is
difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.’”146
However, the court in Papike v. Tambrands, Inc. limited the
holding in Kennedy: “[t]o the extent [the court] concluded in Kennedy
that the MDA cannot preempt any state common-law causes of action,
the conclusion cannot survive in light of the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Medtronic.”147 The plaintiff, in Papike, brought common law
claims against a device manufacturer arising from injuries caused by her
use of tampons.148 Tampons are Class II medical devices and
manufacturers of tampons must comply with specific labeling
requirements.149 The FDA requires specific content in warning labels due
to the risk of Toxic Shock Syndrome to women who use Tampons; such
requirements are codified in 21 C.F.R. § 801.430 (2006).150 In Papike v.
Tambrands, Inc., the court held that the FDA regulations specific to the
device at issue preempted state law failure to warn claims.151
It is unclear to what extent, if at all, the Ninth Circuit would find
preemption where a Class III medical device is subject only to the PMA
process. Papike is an easily distinguishable case, where the product at
issue was subject to very specific content based warnings and where the
plaintiff’s claims were based on inadequate warnings.152 However, the
district court in Clement v. Kaiser Foundation read the court’s decision
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 1459 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1456 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 738.
See id.
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in Papike to hold that the PMA process in itself will constitute a specific
requirement.153 The court stated that the “Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Papike supports the conclusion that the MDA would preempt some tort
claims against the particular devices at issue in this case.”154
2. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit in Oja v. Howmedica held that the FDA approval
of a device is not, standing alone, a specific federal requirement.155 In
this case, the plaintiff brought a negligent failure to warn and products
liability action against Howmedica for injuries related to an artificial hip
implant, a Class II medical device that was marketed under the § 510(k)
process.156 The hip implant was also approved under an IDE exception
for a specific type of use and ultimately received a conditional PMA
approval for such use.157 Although the issue did not involve preemption
of a Class III device specifically approved under the PMA process, the
Tenth Circuit provided instructive language as to how it would rule in a
Class III case.158
From the Supreme Court’s Medtronic decision, the Tenth Circuit
discerned a two prong test for MDA preemption issues.159 The court
found that Medtronic required both a federal requirement and a state
requirement aimed at regulating a specific device.160 The first prong
requires a determination that the FDA imposed a specific federal
requirement applicable to the medical device.161 The second prong asks
whether there are any general state common law requirements
specifically developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices imposed by a
claim.162 Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court determined
that the FDA made labeling demands of the hip implant’s
manufacturer.163 The FDA specifically prohibited the manufacturer from
153

Clement v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., No. CV04-704 WJR (MCx), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26414 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2004).
154
Id. at *16.
155
Oja v. Howmedica, 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997).
156
Id. at 784-87. The FDA’s final rule determined that the device was class II and
stated that the “classification as a class III device was ‘not necessary to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.’” Id. at 787 (citing 21
C.F.R. § 860.93 (2005)).
157
Id. at 787. The hip implant was ultimately approved under the § 510(k) process for
use without cement. Id.
158
Id. at 788.
159
Id.
160
Id. (internal citations omitted).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 789.
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labeling its product for non-cement use.164 The court held that the
labeling mandate constituted a federal requirement in satisfaction of the
first prong.165
However, the court determined that the state law claim for failure to
warn was “not specifically developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices”;
therefore, it failed the second prong.166 The court explained that a claim
for failure to warn cannot be specific to a device where it is universally
applied to all device manufacturers for all devices.167 The manufacturer’s
duty to warn is not device specific so as to conflict with the federal
requirements of safety.168 Thus, the court concluded that the MDA did
not preempt the state common law claim of negligent failure to warn.169
Although the court in Howmedica did not decide or discuss whether
the PMA process would constitute a federal requirement, it appears that
they would not follow the majority rule. In the Tenth Circuit’s analysis,
the court examined whether the FDA had imposed specific requirements
or restrictions on the device, as opposed to whether the process under
either the § 510(k) or the IDE exception were requirements standing
alone.170 In Howmedica, the FDA had imposed a specific requirement,
which prohibited the manufacturer from labeling or promoting a specific
use of the device.171 The Seventh Circuit, in evaluating the Howmedica
decision, stated that unlike the majority of the circuits, “[i]t appears that
the Tenth Circuit would hold . . . that generic common law causes of
action do not meet this test because, when stated without application to a
particular product, they cannot be said to have been developed ‘in
relation to’ the medical device in question.”172
3. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit, in Goodlin v. Medtronic, found that the PMA
approval process is not a specific federal requirement and state common
law tort claims are not preempted.173 In Goodlin, the Class III medical
device at issue was a pacemaker approved by the FDA through the PMA

164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 913 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997).
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1382 (11th Cir. 1999).
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approval process.174 The plaintiff brought claims against the device
manufacturer for negligent design and product liability for injuries
resulting from implantation and removal of a pacemaker.175 The court
“d[id] not believe that requirements applicable to all devices that receive
the FDA’s approval via the PMA process satisfy the [Supreme] Court’s
demand for a specific requirement that applies to a particular device.”176
The court began its analysis by reviewing the extensive measures
undertaken by the device manufacturer in order to complete the PMA
approval process, which spanned over a period of seven years.177 The
court distinguished the Supreme Court’s holding in Medtronic due to the
different approval processes and did not find the Medtronic decision
controlling.178 The Goodlin Court did, however, apply the Supreme
Court’s test for determining preemption.179 The Goodlin Court stated that
preemption of a state common law claim requires the “(1) the imposition
of a specific federal requirement that (2) applied to a particular device
and (3) focused on the safety and effectiveness of the device.”180
According to the Eleventh Circuit, the relevant inquiry boils down to
whether the PMA process is a specific federal requirement regarding the
safety of a specific device.181
The Eleventh Circuit looked to the dictionary definition of
“requirement” as well as the Congressional intent behind the MDA to
decide whether the PMA process was a federal requirement. The court
found that the PMA process did not “require” anything specific of the

174

Id. at 1368. The pacemaker at issue in this case was slightly different than the
pacemaker at issue in Medtronic, and it was approved by the PMA process and not the §
510(k) process. Additionally, the facts at issue in this case were nearly identical to the
facts presented in Kemp v. Medtronic, 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000).
175
Id. at 1369.
176
Id. at 1377 (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir.
1995), overruled in part by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).
177
Id. at 1370.
178
Specifically, the court held:
Despite the striking superficial similarity of the cases, the Supreme Court’s
disposition of [Medtronic] provides little more than a rudimentary analytical
framework to guide our resolution of Medtronic’s preemption claims in this
case because [Medtronic] involved the 510k [sic] process rather than the
PMA process, and because the Court fractured in an all but irreconcilable
manner over the extent to which section 360k(a) would ever preempt a
general state common law tort claim.
Id. at 1371 (citing Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 1997)).
179
Id. at 1372.
180
Id. (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492-94 (1996)).
181
Id. This test is the opposite of the inquiry by the first category of circuits who look
to whether the state common law tort claim constitutes a different requirement, not
whether the PMA approval process is a requirement.
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manufacturer in relation to its device.182 The PMA process applied to all
devices and the court stated that the process was not a “specific
requirement that applies to a particular device.”183 The court also found
that Congress’s intent behind the MDA would be thwarted by allowing
state law claims to be preempted.184 The court noted that as Congress
enacted the MDA to protect consumers from unregulated medical
devices, it does not follow that Congress would, at the same time,
preclude recourse for injured consumers.185 Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit refused to find that the PMA process preempted state common
law claims.186 In conclusion, the court stated, “the FDA’s approval of a
medical device pursuant to the PMA process, standing alone, imposes no
specific federal requirement applicable to a particular device and,
therefore, has no preemptive effect under section 360k(a) of the
MDA.”187
Concluding with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Goodlin, the
disparity that plagues the circuit courts regarding the application of the
express preemption clause of 360k(a) is obvious. Since the Supreme
Court in Medtronic failed to provide a clear path to follow, the courts
have applied disjointed tests to varying facts. The three categories of
reasoning are gross categories at best, with some circuits deviating from
the lines placed by this comment. However, the disorganized reasoning
and the split among the circuits is critical; the decisions affect the rights
of injured consumers throughout the nation. The scope of preemption in
this context remains to be answered by the Supreme Court. However, the
recent decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences provides insight into the
proper test to be applied to the preemption issue.188

182

Id. at 1375-76; see supra note 118.
Id. at 1377 (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir.
1995), overruled in part by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).
184
Id. at 1378.
185
Id. at 1377-78.
The PMA process permits the FDA to regulate the introduction and sale of
medical devices to assure their minimal safety for public consumption-it
does not appear to address the appropriate standards of liability once the
product enters the marketplace. Our inability to discern a specific
requirement that fits the demands of section 360k(a) in the FDA’s approval
process, therefore, finds broader support in the language and structure of the
MDA and is consistent with the factual backdrop that prompted Congress to
enact the MDA.
Id.
186
Id. at 1382.
187
Id.
188
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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III. THE BATES DECISION AND THE “PARALLEL REQUIREMENTS” TEST
The Supreme Court recently decided an issue of federal preemption
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.189 The decision instructs on the issue left
undecided by Medtronic: whether the FDA’s premarket approval process
preempts state common law tort claims. The issue of preemption in Bates
was whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(“FIFRA”) preempted state common law tort claims. The express
preemption provision in the FIFRA statute states that “[s]uch State shall
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter.”190 This language mirrors the MDA’s express preemption
clause.191 Since both clauses preempt state “requirements,” the Supreme
Court’s discussion should guide future interpretations of the MDA’s
express preemption clause.
Texas peanut farmers suffered the harm at issue in Bates after using
the pesticide “Strongarm” on their crops.192 The peanut farmers alleged
the pesticide caused extensive crop damage.193 Dow, the company that
made and sold the pesticide, had a conditional registration from the EPA,
which enabled it to market and sell the pesticide to the peanut farmers
shortly before the planting season.194 The farmers alleged that Dow failed
to include a warning on Strongarm regarding the damage to peanuts
grown in soil with a pH higher than 7.0.195 Although Dow knew that
Strongarm caused such crop damage when used at certain pH levels, the
label made no such claim.196 In fact, the label stated, “Use of Strongarm
is recommended in all areas where peanuts are grown”; farmers who
used Strongarm in accordance with the recommendation experienced
extensive damage to their peanut crops because the pH levels were 7.2
and higher.197 The farmers sued Dow claiming negligence, strict liability,
189

Id.
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006).
191
The MDA provides:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement: (1)
which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness
of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to
the device under this Act.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
192
Bates, 544 U.S. at 434.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 435.
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Id.
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Id.
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“fraud, breach of warranty and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act.”198 Dow defended by claiming that
the farmers’ suit was preempted by the express preemption provision of
the FIFRA.199
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s determination that the express preemption clause in the FIFRA
preempted the farmers’ state law claims.200 The Fifth Circuit analyzed
the express preemption clause in the FIFRA in a manner similar to the
analyses applied by circuit courts in Category I, which consider state
actions to be requirements contrary to the MDA express preemption
provision.201 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[f]or a state to create a
labeling requirement by authorizing a claim linked to the specifications
of a label, even where the EPA has elected not to impose such labeling
requirements, would clearly be to impose a requirement ‘in addition to or
different from those’ required under FIFRA.”202 The Fifth Circuit came
to this conclusion despite its acknowledgement that the EPA does not
impose product specific labeling requirements regarding the
effectiveness of the product registered under FIFRA.203
The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari and reversed the Fifth
Circuit.204 The Supreme Court found that preemption did not apply to the
farmers’ state common law claims.205 Although the Fifth Circuit
followed the majority of its sister circuits, the Supreme Court noted that
the reasoning was incorrect.206 The Court began its analysis of the
express preemption clause with a history of the FIFRA and the intent
behind the statute,207 which was similar to the analysis the Court applied
to the MDA in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr.208
The Supreme Court first noted that the preemption clause in the
FIFRA only applied to state “requirements.”209 The Court explicitly
stated that “[a]n occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision
does not qualify as a requirement.”210 In defining requirement in terms of
what it is not, the court stated that the “[c]ourt of [a]ppeals was therefore
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
Id. at 436.
Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C. v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 331 (5th Cir. 2003).
See supra Part II.A.
Dow Agrosciences, 332 F.3d at 331.
Id. at 330.
Bates, 544 U.S. at 454; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 542 U.S. 936 (2004).
Bates, 544 U.S. at 445.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 437-42.
518 U.S. 470, 475-80 (1996).
Bates, 544 U.S. at 443.
Id.

2006] Preemption Under the MDA: Can Bates Mend the Wound?

263

quite wrong when it assumed that any event, such as a jury verdict, that
might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer to change its label should be
viewed as a requirement.”211 Therefore, the Court stuck down the
“effects-based” definition of requirement and explained that “[a]
requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury
verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a
requirement.”212 The Court determined that, while a requirement is not a
jury verdict alone, the definition could still “reach[] beyond positive
enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace common-law
duties.”213
Also important to the analysis, the court found that the statute only
preempts state law claims that are “in addition to or different from” the
requirements under the FIFRA.214 The Court concluded, “a state-law
labeling requirement is not pre-empted by [the statute] if it is equivalent
to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provisions.”215 The
Court then went on to find support in its definition of requirement and
the scope of preemption from its previous decision in Medtronic, which
it clearly interpreted as creating a “parallel requirements” approach to
preemption.216 The Court referred to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Medtronic, which stated “[s]ection 360k does not preclude States from
imposing different or additional remedies, but only different or additional
requirements.”217 According to the Court, this provided support for the
principle that state law remedies could be provided to injured consumers
where the federal law does not allow for such remedy.218
The Supreme Court also used Medtronic to justify its holding that
FIFRA does not preempt state law tort claims where they parallel to
federal requirements. The Court explained:
“Even if it may be necessary as a matter of Florida law to prove
that those violations were the result of negligent conduct, or that
they created an unreasonable hazard for users of the product,
such additional elements of the state-law cause of action would
make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than the
federal requirement. While such a narrower requirement might be
‘different from’ the federal rules in a literal sense, such a
211
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Id. at 448 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 513 (1996) (O’Connor, J.,
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difference would surely provide a strange reason for finding preemption of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule.”219

The Court further emphasized “that a state-law labeling requirement
must in fact be equivalent to a requirement under FIFRA in order to
survive pre-emption.”220 The parallel requirements holding in Bates
should be applied to preemption under the MDA; the relevant inquiry
should become whether state common law tort claims equate to the
federal requirements of safety imposed by the PMA process.
A. Applying Bates to the Express Preemption Clause
Although the two statutes are substantively different, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the FIFRA’s express preemption clause is
instructive as to the future interpretation of preemption under the PMA
process. The language utilized by the two statutes is nearly identical and
the Supreme Court looked to its own decision in Medtronic for the
definition of “requirement.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Bates
could allow state common law tort claims against device manufacturers
where the claims parallel federal requirements. The PMA process itself is
not a specific federal requirement under this analysis, because it is the
guarantee of safety that the state law claims should be compared with.
The PMA process is meant to ensure the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices and most state common law tort claims parallel the
requirement of safety. Claims that parallel the interests promoted by
PMA approval should be allowed to go forward in state courts.
Preemption should only apply where state common law claims ask for
something different than was required in the PMA process. The circuit
courts in Category I and Category II should reevaluate their positions on
preemption.221 The Court’s language in Bates is very clear; it advocated
an interpretation of the term “requirement” that allows for state common
law tort claims where the federal requirements are also in the interest of
safety.222 The Court explained that “we would nevertheless have a duty
to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption. ‘[B]ecause the States
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of
action.’”223
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Id. at 448, n.23 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495).
Id. at 453.
See supra Part II.A-B.
Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.
Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
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Bates also provided examples of what Congress most likely
intended when it drafted the preemption clause to prohibit additional or
different state requirements. The court explained:
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments suggests that
Congress had conflicting state labeling regulations in mind when
crafting § 136v(b) [the FIFRA preemption clause]. As one
industry representative testified: “Some States might want the
word ‘flammable,’ some ‘inflammable.’ . . . Some States might
want red lettering; others orange, another yellow, and so forth.
We ask this committee, therefore, to recognize, as the Congress
has in a number of similar regulatory statutes, the industry’s need
for uniformity by providing for this in the act.”. . . By contrast,
the lengthy legislative history is barren of any indication that
Congress meant to abrogate most of the common-law duties long
owed by pesticide manufacturers.224

This language indicates that Congress intended to preempt state specific
requirements that would effectively result in conflicting interstate
conditions and increased burdens on manufacturers. In the medical
device context, the courts should apply the same analysis to allow claims
that effect parallel requirements. It is likely that when Congress chose the
term “requirement” it meant a requirement to be something specific
about a device that differed from state to state, so as to ensure uniform
device performance as well as to avoid overburdening device
manufacturers. It does not follow that Congress intended to suspend state
law claims sounding in negligence and product liability where medical
devices malfunction and cause harm to consumers. The requirements
imposed by state common law tort claims would be in concurrence with
the intent of the MDA and the purview of the FDA’s regulation of the
devices so long as the common law tort claims relate to safety. Applying
the “parallel requirements” test to MDA preemption issues would
effectively allow most state common law tort claims and provide
consumers the necessary recourse in the law that Congress intended.
Although the Bates Court did not address the PMA process, the
decision provides ammunition for opponents of preemption under the
MDA. Opponents of preemption can cite to Bates and show how the
holding allows state common law tort claims, which are similar to the
general requirements imposed by the PMA process. Applying this
analysis, opponents of preemption could show that state common law

224

Id. at 452 n.26 (citation omitted).
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claims are merely different remedies, which are not precluded as
requirements under section 360k.225
B. The Appropriate Legal Standard
With Bates as ammunition and the split amongs the circuits, the
stage is set for change. Some persons injured by defective Class III
medical devices can seek recourse in the law, while most cannot. The
Supreme Court must step in, because, unfortunately, it appears that the
circuits will remain divided. The meaning of the term “requirement” has
been debated throughout numerous court opinions. Even the courts that
align themselves in outcome are not uniform in the test they apply. The
appropriate legal standard should be the “parallel requirements” test. The
Bates decision should provide clarity to the preemption analysis and
courts should find that state common law claims are not preempted
where the FDA has failed to issue device specific requirements.
This debate has become one of judicial legislation. The circuit
courts have tried to determine the scope of a statute’s express preemption
clause armed with an ambiguous Supreme Court decision that has
provided little guidance. Where the legislature has been unclear as to the
scope of a statute’s coverage regarding preemption, judicial legislation
should be avoided. The Supreme Court recognized an obligation to avoid
judicial legislation where it is properly “left to Congress the task of
drafting a narrower statute.”226 Additionally, the Supreme Court stated, in
Burns v. United States, that “[a]lthough ‘we construe statutes, where
possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof,’ it is not
our practice to supplement their provisions simply because we think that
some statutory provision might usefully do further duty than Congress
has assigned to it.”227 Unlike judicial legislation, which supplements a
statute’s original intent, the Legislature has the power to change the
wording of a statute to best represent its intent.
Concerns regarding the separation of powers are abundant where
circuit courts make inconsistent decisions affecting private litigants’
rights. If Congress feels that state common law tort claims cause
manufacturers harm, then it is within Congress’s power to amend the
statute to specifically exclude such actions. The Ninth Circuit in Kennedy
v. Collagen stated that “[t]he federal law requiring the pre-market
approval of Class III devices was not enacted in order to free
225
Id. at 448 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
226
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995).
227
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 145 (1991) (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n. v. Solimino, 499 U.S. 946 (1991)).
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manufacturers from the everyday burdens of the marketplace after they
are permitted to enter it.”228 Therefore, finding manufacturers immune
from state common law tort claims is in direct contravention to the intent
of Congress in enacting the MDA.
Forum shopping, due to the advantageous positions held by patients
injured within a jurisdiction that allows state common law tort claims
against Class III medical device manufacturers even where they are
approved under a PMA process, is also a concern. Unfortunately, most
persons injured by medical devices are not circuit court judges, lawyers,
device manufacturers or members of the FDA. Rather, they are injured
consumers who would not know to check whether the medical device
they are using was approved under the § 510(k) process or the PMA
process. Consumers expect that, if they are injured by a device through
no fault of their own, they have recourse for their suffering through the
legal system. If the goal behind enacting the MDA was protecting
persons injured by medical devices, taking away the right to sue for these
injuries is unfair.
Allowing state common law tort claims would relieve some of the
burden placed on the FDA as the ultimate arbitrator of what is safe and
good.229 The FDA is the ultimate gatekeeper of what medical devices
enter the market. In addition, the FDA takes the pressure off the
manufacturer by making sure the product is safe. The public relies on the
FDA for its critical determination that a medical device is safe for use.
Recently, the FDA has come under major fire with regards to its
handling of medical devices and the safety it promises.230 Failing to give
the injured a right to compensation in the legal system is manifestly
unjust. The FDA’s approval of a device is a necessary and important step
in achieving the goal of safety for consumers, but the legal system should
step in where the FDA fails to provide recourse for the injured.
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Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part
by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (“Premarket approval is supposed to
benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free from liability, for manufacturers. Courts
which have held to the contrary have done so in contravention of the FDA’s regulations
and statement concerning the preemptive scope of the MDA.”).
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For an interesting discussion on a different problem related to the FDA’s
regulation of medical devices stemming from its role as the primary gatekeeper of market
access, see Noel D. Campbell, Replace FDA Regulation of Medical Devices with ThirdParty Certification, No. 288, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, Nov. 12, 1997,
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CONCLUSION
Finding state common law tort claims preempted by the FDA’s
premarket approval of a Class III medical device would render injured
consumers without the appropriate recourse in the law. “[T]he MDA
provides no federal means by which injured plaintiffs can pursue legal
remedies against the manufacturers of defective medical devices.”231 By
allowing such claims to proceed against device manufacturers, in certain
cases, the states would be allowing “remedies” rather than imposing
“requirements.” The “parallel requirements” test provides the appropriate
analysis by which courts can uniformly approach a growing problem.
Additionally, tort law claims generally relate to the safety of the device
and parallel the federal safety standards. The Supreme Court decision in
Bates should be combined with the holding in Medtronic to create a more
permissive scheme for allowing common law claims where the medical
device is approved by the PMA process and not subject to any specific
requirements.
Furthermore, allowing state common law claims into court would
not be the end-all for device manufacturers. The success of such common
law tort claims would be questionable because the FDA’s approval
should naturally create a presumption of safety that the plaintiff would
have to overcome. The issue is getting such claims into court and
allowing injured consumers a right of action. By allowing state law
claims, the states would not be an additional gate through which the
device manufacturer must pass; the FDA will retain its primary role as a
gatekeeper. However, once allowed through that gate by the FDA, the
medical device manufacturers should not be able to roam free by gaining
substantial immunity from suit because their devices have been approved
by the PMA process. In light of the split among the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Medtronic and Bates, state common law
claims should not be preempted where they parallel federal requirements.
Injured consumers should be allowed to bring claims against medical
device manufacturers. The ultimate goal of the FDA’s role in medical
device regulation should be safety of the patient. Allowing state common
law claims would support that goal.
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Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1379 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996)) (“Reading the PMA process to
impose specific federal requirements that enjoy preemptive effect under section 360k,
therefore, would deprive all persons suffering injury as a result of a defective device--the
very class of persons that Congress intended to protect by enacting the MDA—of ‘most,
if not all relief.’”).

